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Keeping Pace with Cyber Power, Defense, and Warfare
Review Essay by Michael Olender, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton
University, Ottawa, Canada, michaelolender@gmail.com
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.
Daniel Ventre (ed.), Cyber Conflict: Competing National Perspectives. Hoboken: John Wiley &
Sons, 2012.
Paulo Shakarian, Jana Shakarian, and Andrew Ruef, Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A
Multidisciplinary Approach. Amsterdam and Boston: Syngress, 2013.
Cyber power continues to take shape in accordance with world events. Three recently published
books have taken different approaches to the subject of what may be broadly termed “cyber
operations.” The context for these operations is strictly the 21st century, and the evolving notion
of power involves the diffusion of power among countries and non-state actors. Questions
abound about the contours and limitations of cyber power, but what is clear across these books is
that the cyber domain is indeed the next power frontier, within which both vulnerabilities and
opportunities are created.
Cyber power
In The Future of Power, Joseph Nye looks at dimensions of power—itself a contested
concept that he says often reflects interests and values—and how power evolves. Nye (2011, pp.
5-7) defines power thusly: “For my interest in actions and policies . . . power is the capacity to do
things and in social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want . . . . A policyoriented concept of power depends upon a specified context to tell us who gets what, how,
where, and when.” First, he outlines types of power, covering the various aspects of power in
world politics—such as the three faces of relational power, which are commanding change,
controlling agendas, and shaping preferences—then moves on to discuss military power,
economic power, and soft power. He then identifies two power shifts occurring in this century,
one being power diffusion related to the evolution of cyber power, the other being power
transition based on the question of American decline. He concludes the book with a policyoriented elaboration of “smart power,” a mix of hard and soft power strategies. Many of Nye’s
arguments and evidence hardly need to be repeated, as they are part of a synthesis of decades’
worth of scholarship in the field of international relations, but it should be mentioned that he
shows a deft hand with his writing on conceptual innovations in power.
Nye’s contribution to existing scholarship lies in his analysis of power diffusion with
respect to the cyber domain. While power transition from one hegemonic state to another is a
process that has been repeated throughout history, power diffusion is more novel, writes Nye. He
should be commended for deciphering the cyber domain as a new power frontier with analytical
precision and linking it to the phenomenon of power diffusion. The “Information Revolution,”
with advancements in communication through the Internet and reductions in the costs of
computing and communication, is the enabling factor that brings down barriers to entry into
world politics. With lower barriers to entry, non-state actors “are empowered to play direct roles
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in world politics,” with some aspects of the Information Revolution helping small states and nonstate actors, while others help large, already powerful states (Nye, 2011, pp. 116-117). Avoiding
oversimplification, he provides an overview of new opportunities and diffusion trends in
transnational activity involving non-state actors such as multinational corporations and terrorist
groups, specifying: “The real issue related to the diffusion of power is not the continued
existence of the state, but how it functions” (Nye, 2011, p. 119). Understanding cyber space as a
relatively new operational domain premised on interconnected electronic systems and associated
infrastructure, Nye (2011, p. 123) writes:
Cyberpower can be defined in terms of a set of resources that relate to the creation,
control, and communication of electronic and computer-based information—
infrastructure, networks, software, human skills . . . . Defined behaviorally,
cyberpower is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through the use of the
electronically interconnected information resources of the cyberdomain. Cyberpower
can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace, or it can use
cyberinstruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains outside
cyberspace.
Further, noting that small states and non-state actors can play significant roles in world
politics at low levels of cost, Nye maintains that large, already powerful states, such as the
United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, do not enjoy dominance in the cyber domain.
Rather, their dependence on interconnected electronic systems for military and economic
activities creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited. His extensive discussions about
information and physical instruments that can act as hard and soft power resources—with hard
power including the use of malicious code to steal intellectual property or disrupt electronically
controlled industrial systems and soft power including the utilization of software to help human
rights activists—along with his discussion of the relational power resources of actors in the cyber
domain can be instructive in mapping power relations and vulnerabilities among actors.
Regarding major cyber threats to national security, he highlights economic espionage and crime,
which currently have the highest costs, and cyber war and cyber terrorism, with states having
offensive capabilities that are stronger than defensive capabilities and with terrorist groups
ranking near the bottom of the capabilities hierarchy. Normative differences largely preclude
reaching multilateral agreements on issues related to the cyber domain, with Nye (2011, p. 150)
offering the example: “From the American point of view, Twitter and YouTube are matters of
personal freedom; seen from Beijing or Tehran, they are instruments of attack.” Hence, self-help
is the dominant governance norm, and policies on international deterrence as well as network
and infrastructure resilience are the dominant management strategies.
Nye’s inquiry into power diffusion and the new implications of cyber power should
inspire reflection, especially regarding limitations. Diffusion evidently does not imply the
equality of power among traditional and new actors in world politics. His assessment of how
technological change is reshaping international relations is thought-provoking, but the chapter is
arguably relatively light on evidence. Other shortcomings also slightly weaken Nye’s text. Only
being able to discuss rather recent events notwithstanding, Nye too often assumes knowledge
about cyber issues on the part of his readers. For instance, he makes passing mention to
“hacktivism” and provides the example that “Taiwanese and Chinese hackers regularly deface
each other’s Websites with electronic graffiti” (Nye, 2011, p. 126). Later, on the issue of
governments remaining the most powerful actors in world politics, he writes, “Even the small
United Arab Emirates was able to force the maker of the BlackBerry to compromise,” without
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giving details about the compromise between the monarchy and BlackBerry creator Research in
Motion, a Canadian company (Nye, 2011, p. 150). He provides only a single case study, one on
the interactions between Google, an American company, and the government of China related to
alleged efforts by the government to steal the company’s source code and enter the email
accounts of Chinese activists, to illustrate how companies, governments, and individual hackers
use various instruments to generate their preferred outcomes within and outside the cyber
domain. Moreover, his American-centric perspective makes the scope of cyber power discernible
but its scale difficult to estimate. Nye’s final chapter on smart power is largely an articulation of
how the United States can manage political decline and boost economic prosperity by being open
to alignment with other countries rather than seeking primacy within the international system.
Problematically, however, such a strategy may be able to stem power transition but not power
diffusion. With the onus of its message on the future, the book’s value, then, is its systematic
conceptual elaboration of how cyber power is increasingly undergirding international
interactions among a vast number of traditional and new actors, with the consequence being the
reduction in relative power differentials among these actors.
Cyber defense
Daniel Ventre’s edited volume Cyber Conflict: Competing National Perspectives goes
beyond the American experience to look at the perspectives of Canada, Cuba, France, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Singapore, Slovenia, and South Africa on developing cyber strategies and managing
cyber operations. It takes a high-level policy view and mainly focuses on cyber security and
defense. Twelve authors, including Ventre, offer much insight into national interpretations of the
concepts of cyber threats, conflict, attacks, and warfare. National doctrinal frameworks and the
connections between the civilian and military dimensions of cyber operations are critical for
understanding cyber warfare in particular, since “the reality is that national doctrines of
information operations and cyber-warfare are as varied as human fingerprints. Countries . . .
carry their particular historical experiences and strategic concerns with them. These are
instrumental in shaping national cyber-warfare doctrines with distinct features, reflecting the
geopolitical identity of each nation” (Fitsanakis, qtd. in Ventre, 2012, sec. 4). Across the
volume’s studies, the sometimes surprising degree of countries’ shared dependence on the cyber
domain and the variety of instruments they use to manage the negative effects of that
dependence, such as policies, laws, standards, and the creation of agencies, make for a
compelling read.
Studies come to varied conclusions based on policy documents and historical events. In
Canada, the development of cyber-security policies has accelerated in this century, with the
major concern being the protection of critical infrastructure. In Cuba, the regime in power
perceives cyber space to be a threat to its stability, so the flow of information is strictly
controlled to stem foreign interference or influence. France structures its defense in relation to
economic crises and the new international balance related to the recent revolutions in North
Africa. Italy has established agencies and policies to combat cyber crime and protect intellectual
property rights, but its cyber-security strategy is at a nascent stage. In Japan, a new strategy has
been put forward that includes the use of cyber space in defense policy and military doctrine, a
shift for a country with a unique defense arrangement following the Secord World War.
Singapore’s approach is twofold, with a cyber-security authority collaborating with the private
sector to defend the island’s highly globalized economy against the high incidence of cyber
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attacks on corporations, as well as the military expanding cyber capabilities to enhance
conventional capabilities. Given an already high general sense of security, Slovenia sees the
costs of investment in cyber security difficult to justify and is thus largely unprepared for cyber
attacks. South Africa has the most advanced communication infrastructure in Africa and is in the
process of developing cyber-security policies since there is potential for the exploitation of
vulnerabilities in a cyber-warfare scenario on the continent.
An outstanding study is Joseph Fitsanakis’s chapter on Greece. Despite its relatively
small size and weak economy, Greece’s geopolitical position at the crux of Europe and the
Middle East means that spillover effects from cyber threats or attacks within the country “could
massively impact on international shipping patterns, energy transportation networks, global
banking, [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO military and communications assets, and
regional telecommunications systems” (Fitsanakis, qtd. in Ventre, 2012, sec. 4.1). A major part
of the country’s doctrinal framework is informed by power politics with Turkey—an age-old
ethnic, religious, and geostrategic rival—characterized by internal balancing based on
technological superiority. Events such as the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the
Ergenekon affair—revealed in 2007, involving Turkish military and intelligence officers
devising propaganda to destabilize Greece for the benefit of Turkish national interests—are
considered to be formative experiences that catalyzed Greece’s drive to maintain defensive
technological superiority. Despite the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis that began in 2009,
Greece maintains the highest proportional defense spending in NATO, and asymmetrical
balancing may be enabling capabilities beyond communication systems: “In the particular
context of Greek–Turkish strategic relations, the anticipatory (preventive or pre-emptive) aspects
of information operations are in agreement with broader efforts by Greek military planners to
steer the country’s military thinking toward offense-oriented strategic concepts” (Fitsanakis, qtd.
in Ventre, 2012, sec. 4.8). Notably, Greece’s Ministry of National Defense announced the
formation of a new National Cyberdefense Authority in 2011 to protect the country against cyber
attacks following new organizational standards set by NATO, of which both Greece and Turkey
are members. The case of Greece is exemplary, as it demonstrates why and how a country can
become an innovator in cyber defense given economic problems, regional context, and alliance
arrangements.
The edited volume contains exceptional scholarship that underscores the relevance of the
cyber domain to all types of countries. Constraining international contexts based on alliances and
obligations often affect the development of national cyber strategies, which in turn determine
capabilities and power resources. Hence, various contexts, especially military and economic
contexts, must be taken into account in estimates of the scale of cyber power. Distinct historical
experiences and strategic concerns are paramount in the cyber domain, which is evidently an
extension of other domains rather than something completely novel. A fine contribution is
Ventre’s concretization of a visualization of cyber space, which he defines as a “fifth dimension”
of general human activity, consisting of three layers—from bottom to the top, the physical,
material, hardware, infrastructure, networks layer, the application layer, and the cognitive
layer—and intersecting with the four conventional dimensions, land, sea, air, and space. Ventre
(2012, sec. 10.1) outlines the association of each layer with relevant actors, actions, and
theoretical considerations, affirming that the definition of cyber space “expresses the
transversality of cyberspace with the real dimension” and is useful in reconsidering perceptions
of incidents, actions, and stakes as well as representations of threats. His visualization of cyber
space as a matrix could have wide analytical applications since it improves upon oversimplified
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definitions. The only oversight in this volume is the choice to forgo a discussion on the overall
strategic purposes of cyber power in favor of a short, arguably underdeveloped conclusion about
cyber operations as an evolution in policy, rather than a revolution, given regional contexts and
geopolitical strengths. Technological, tactical, and operational aspects are discussed throughout,
but the strategic purposes of cyber power for the ends of policy during both peace and war are
assumed to be (perhaps necessarily) context-specific.
Cyber warfare
Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach by Paulo Shakarian, Jana
Shakarian, and Andrew Ruef comprises a series of comprehensive case studies that present in
detail the scope of cyber warfare, specifically how cyber warfare is used to achieve political
objectives, cyber espionage and exploitation, and cyber attacks on various kinds of physical
infrastructure. The authors focus on the strategic purposes of cyber power in consideration of the
fact that the origins of cyber attacks can be obscured. Notably, they offer middle-range
theoretical perspectives—integrating theory with empirical research by identifying an empirical
phenomenon that appears to explain correlations, abstracting from it, then verifying it with data,
or at least deriving research questions. This approach proves to be quite fruitful for an area of
research that changes rapidly.
Political cyber attacks first garnered major international attention in 2007 when Estonia
endured distributed denial of service attacks following the movement of a Second World War–
era monument to Soviet soldiers, which incited a Russian pro-Kremlin youth group to target the
Estonian Parliament’s email servers. Cyber attacks then augmented Russia’s military campaign
against Georgia in 2008 by silencing the media and effectively isolating the country from the
international community. The cyber domain was also used to publicize different narratives
during the Israel-Hezbollah “July War” of 2006 and has been manipulated to limit the free
speech of domestic dissidents in Russia and Iran over time. An extended chapter on cyber attacks
by Anonymous and its affiliates adds an additional perspective on the ideologies, capabilities,
and (largely benign though symbolic) efforts of non-state hacking groups, which tend to act
against abuses of power by governments, corporations, and individuals related to the freedom of
information and right to online privacy. Regarding cyber espionage and exploitation, case studies
on Chinese cyber espionage against militaries, dissidents, and corporations, malware such as
Duqu, Flame, and Gauss, and the hacking of drone feeds by Iraqi insurgents illuminate the
computer science aspects of cyber operations that allow political objectives to be achieved. A
look at the references for these chapters indicates the types of sources—publications by
computer security firms, for example—that need to be surveyed to gain a better understanding of
cyber operations. With regard to cyber attacks on infrastructure, which include those on
industrial control systems, power grids, and Iran’s nuclear facilities, palpable are the
advancements in computer science that broaden the potential targets for political attacks. Cyber
operations became a widely credible threat in 2010 when the Stuxnet worm was discovered at
Iranian nuclear facilities, an event that galvanized international discourse on the subject of cyber
power. Stuxnet, which destroyed centrifuges and set back Iran’s nuclear program, is considered
representative of a “revolution of military affairs” since the software invalidated several security
assumptions, such as the presumed benefits of computer systems isolated from the Internet
(Shakarian, Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013, p. 233).
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Middle-range theorizing throughout the book is innovative since it breaks the confines of
international relations theories such as realism and liberalism to tap into the insights of people
closest to relevant events, abstract from these insights, then apply them to other events over time.
For instance, Shakarian, Shakarian, and Ruef (2013, p. 120), preceding their discussion on
China’s cyber strategy being an integral component of its international relations, outline the
thinking behind Chinese cyber doctrine:
Another line of thought in Chinese writing to justify their seemingly bold moves in
cyber space is that they believe these activities can be done with relative impunity. In
a 2009 article in China Military Science, Senior Colonel Long Fangcheng and Senior
Colonel Li Decai state that cyber operations directed against social, economic, and
political targets can be done without fear of such activities leading to large-scale
military engagements. As such is the case, they generally regard cyber warfare as an
element of soft power—albeit one with great effects. They then proceed to claim that
the ultimate effect of this highly effective form of soft power is that the line between
peacetime and wartime becomes blurred. This blurring may be a hallmark of cyber
operations in general and might lead to the metaphorical endless war in the near
future.
By using qualitative methodologies, highlighting contextual factors and caveats, and avoiding
causal hypotheses, middle-range theoretical approaches appear to boost explanatory power. The
book, however, is missing a comparative investigation of middle-range theoretical perspectives,
with most theories applying only to a certain national context and assuming a unified state by not
considering intervening variables, such as public opinion and political opposition. Comparative
investigation is certainly an avenue for future study in this area of research. A comparison of the
cyber doctrine of China to those of the United States and Russia would be fascinating.
Sometimes the authors seem to overestimate what counts as an effective attack with their
use of language—freely using the word “assault” for distributed denial of service attacks, for
example—and, overall, references suggest that many cyber attacks are not garnering the attention
of distinguished scholars. Given difficulties with data availability and the rapid pace of
developments in the area of research, the authors use open sources, including conference papers
and media reports, an approach that may sometimes be necessary and thus should be noted by
both scholars and policy-makers going forward. Nonetheless, the book strikes an important
balance on the issue of information dissemination, with the capabilities to provide or block
information, which have bearing on the world’s attention and action, being perhaps the most
salient strategic purposes of cyber power. The problem of the attribution of attacks is well
covered, with interesting political perspectives on combatants and observers in Israel and Gaza
supporting war efforts by uploading digital images to Twitter and YouTube from mobile phones,
Russia appearing to be in a constant state of cyber civil war, and Iran’s formal Iranian Cyber
Army as an offensive asset and its Cyber Police as a defensive one. Overall, the book’s scope,
which is enabled by a multidisciplinary approach, is its primary value, and its depth and detail
make it more than an introductory text.
Cyber surveillance?
The overarching theme across these three vital books is emergence, and each of the three
texts’ distinct angles either fill each other’s gaps or provide correctives. Still, there is a pervasive
sense of catching up to speed, with authors (some of whom admit that they are learning as they
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go along) highlighting policy-makers’ quotes about the need for comprehensive strategies going
forward. The multidisciplinary approach employed in these works greatly helps delineate
conceptualizations of cyber power and implications for policies on cyber defense and warfare.
To further strengthen the relevance of this area of research (and to speak to the larger field of
international relations), it would be advisable for scholars to engage in a feedback loop and
continuously comment on what cyber power, defense, and warfare are and what they can be.
Former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s leaks beginning in June 2013
about American global surveillance programs have provided a glimpse into the ever-broadening
scope of cyber power. These leaks necessitate further study that moves beyond cyber attacks,
information assurance, and political and legal accountability to contemplate the politics and
power implications of cyber surveillance. Is cyber surveillance a strategy to stem power
diffusion? How do the realities of cyber surveillance change the way that the state functions?
And what does cyber surveillance mean for the cyber power of non-state actors? What seems
niche now appears to be impacting the nature of power around the world, and scholarship must
keep pace.

